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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sarah Joann Fencl appeals from the sentence imposed upon her guilty
plea to felony driving under the influence, and from the district court's denial of
her l.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
A Boise police officer stopped Fencl for a taillight violation and for failing to
maintain her lane. (PSI, p.79. 1) The officer noted that Fencl slurred her speech
and exhibited memory impairment. (Id.) The officer also detected a slight odor of
alcohol.

(Id.)

Fencl failed the standard field sobriety tests.

(PSI, pp.82-83.)

After Fencl refused to submit to a breath test, officers obtained a warrant to draw
a blood sample. (PSI, pp.83-84.) Testing of the blood sample revealed a .170
BAC. (PSI, p.88.) Because Fencl had two prior felony DUI convictions within the
previous fifteen years, the state charged her with both felony driving under the
influence and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.51-52, 6869.)
Pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement, Fencl pied guilty to felony driving
under the influence and the sentencing enhancement.

(R., pp.80-83; Tr., p.5,

L.17 - p.14, L.6.) Pursuant to the agreement, the state was required to cap its
sentencing recommendation to five years fixed and 10 years indeterminate, and
Fencl was permitted to request that the court retain jurisdiction. (R., pp.80-83.)

1

Citations to the PSI are to the electronic file "FENCL_psi."
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The district court followed the state's recommendation and imposed a unified 15year sentence with five years fixed.

(R., pp.85-88.)

The court then denied

Fencl's subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., pp.92-94,
106-109.) Fencl timely appealed. (R., pp.111-115.)

2

ISSUES
Fencl states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion, both at sentencing
and in denying the Rule 35 motion, when it failed to
recognize that the persistent violator statute did not require
the imposition of a minimum sentence of five years fixed, but
a minimum unified sentence of five years?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed,
upon Ms. Fencl, a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five
years fixed, following her pleas of guilty to driving under the
influence and a persistent violator enhancement?

(Appellant's brief, p.3)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Fencl failed to show that the district court's sentencing determination
and denial of Fencl's I.C.R. 35 motion were based upon a
misunderstanding of its sentencing discretion with regard to the persistent
violator enhancement?

2.

Has Fencl failed to show that the district court imposed an excessive
sentence?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Fencl Has Failed To Show That The District Court's Sentencing Determination
And Denial Of Fencl's I.C.R. 35 Motion Were Based Upon A Misunderstanding Of
Its Sentencing Discretion With Regard To The Persistent Violator Enhancement
A.

Introduction
Fencl contends that the district court was not aware that the persistent

violator sentencing enhancement permitted it to impose a fixed term of
incarceration of less than five years, and that it therefore abused its discretion in
imposing its sentence and in denying Fencl's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of
sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-10.) However, a review of the record reveals
that the district court was aware of the applicable law and the scope of its
discretion.

Further, even if the district court misperceived the scope of its

discretion, any such error was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Sentencing determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State

v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 745, 52 P.3d 886, 890 (Ct. App. 2002).

When

evaluating a claim that the trial court has abused its discretion, the sequence of
the appellate court's inquiry is first, whether the trial court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; second, whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices availability to it; and finally, whether the trial court reached its
discretion by an exercise of reason.

Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho

Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
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C.

The District Court's Sentencing Determinations Were Not Based Upon A
Misunderstanding Of The Scope Of Its Discretion
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) allows a trial court to correct a sentence that is

illegal from the face of the record any time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84,
218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a
motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35(b) is a plea for leniency, and this
Court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).
The Idaho persistent violator sentencing enhancement provides that upon
a third conviction for a felony, an individual "shall be sentenced to a term in the
custody of the state board of correction which term shall be for not less than five
(5) years and said term may extend for life." I.C. § 19-2514.
In State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 566-568, 990 P.2d 144, 147-149 (Ct.
App. 1999), the Court of Appeals, analyzing the language of I.C. § 19-2514 and
applying the rule of lenity,

held that the persistent violator sentencing

enhancement did not prohibit district courts from imposing suspended sentences
upon persistent violators. lg_,. In State v. Toyne, 151 Idaho 779, 781-783, 264
P.3d 418, 420-422 (Ct. App. 2011 ), the Court of Appeals similarly held that the
district court abused its discretion when at the sentencing hearing, it expressed a
belief that I.C. § 19-2514 required it to impose a minimum sentence of five years
fixed. !Q.,.

Therefore, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514, as interpreted by Harrington

and Toyne, the district court in the present case had the discretion to impose a

unified sentence of between five years and life, and to suspend the sentence if it
so chose.
5

Pursuant to plea agreement, Fencl was permitted to request that the
district court suspend the sentence and retain jurisdiction. (R., pp.80-83; Tr., p.1,
L.11 - p.2, L.17.) At the change of plea hearing, the district court specifically
referenced Toyne and made clear that it was aware of its discretion to suspend
Fencl's sentence. (Tr., p.7, Ls.9-19.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court
again recognized it had discretion to suspend Finch's sentence, but declined to
do so, citing Fencl's significant criminal history and previous unsuccessful
rehabilitative attempts. (Tr., p.31, L.2 - p.33, L.21.) The court instead chose to
follow the state's recommendation and imposed a unified 15-year sentence with
five years fixed. (R., pp.85-88.)
In an I.C.R. 35 motion, 2 Fencl asserted that the district court was unaware
of the scope of its sentencing discretion. Fencl argued:
Although the Court stated at sentencing that its discretion
was limited by the persistent violator statute, the Court had
discretion to sentence the minimum mandatory sentence of thirty
days and suspend the [sic] any or all of the persistent violator term
or to sentence Defendant to a fixed life term or any unified
sentence between those extremes.
(R., pp.93-94.) Fencl's motion concluded:
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court reconsider
her sentence of five years fixed followed by ten years indeterminate
and consider a lesser fixed period.
(R., p.94.)

In its written order denying Fencl's I.C.R. 35 motion, the district court relied
primarily on the reasoning it utilized to support the original sentence - Fencl's

2

Fencl cited both I.C.R. 35(a) and (b). (R., p.93.)
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criminal history and prior failed rehabilitative attempts.

(R., pp.106-109.)

However, prior to the portion of the order that contained this analysis, the court
also stated:
The Defendant's motion for reconsideration acknowledges a
fixed term of five years was required but asks the court, in its
discretion[], for leniency in a reduction of the indeterminate portion
of the sentence.
(R., p.107.)
On appeal, Fencl relies on this excerpt to argue that the district court's
sentencing determination and denial of the I.C.R. 35 motion was based upon a
misunderstanding of its discretion pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. (Appellant's brief,
pp.6-7.)

However, in light of its previously-expressed knowledge of State v.

Toyne, it is more likely that this excerpt constitutes simply an inadvertent
statement or typo that did not accurately reflect the court's understanding of its
sentencing discretion.

In State v. Toyne, the Court of Appeals expressly

recognized that I.C. § 19-2514 "requires only a unified sentence of at least five
years, not a fixed term of five years." Toyne, 151 Idaho at 781-782, 264 P.3d at
420-421 (emphasis in original).

In light of the district court's expressed

knowledge of this case, Fencl cannot show that the district court actually
misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion.
However, in the alternative, even if the district court misperceived its
sentencing discretion, it is clear from the record that any such misunderstanding
did not actually impact the court's sentencing determination or denial of Fencl's
I.C.R. 35 motion.

Any such error is therefore harmless.

See State v. Morgan,

109 Idaho 1040, 1043, 712 P.2d 741, 744 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that in the
7

context of sentencing, error is harmless, and remand is unnecessary, "if it is plain
from the judge's reasoning that the result would not change or if it appears that
any different result would represent an abuse of the judge's discretion."); see also
State v. lsh, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 2619597 *3 (Ct. App. 2014).
There is no indication in the record that the district court would have
actually imposed a lesser fixed sentence if it was aware of its discretion to do so.
Instead, it is clear from the court's comments at the sentencing hearing and its
I.C.R. 35 denial order that the court decided to follow the state's recommendation
due to Fencl's prior criminal history and failed previous rehabilitative attempts,
not because of any misunderstanding of its sentencing discretion. See Tr., p.31,
L.2 - p.33, L.21; R., pp.106-109.)

Unlike in Toyne. the district court in the

present case did not directly reject any particular sentencing request by reciting
an incorrect interpretation of the requirements of I.C. § 19-2514. Next. the state
never argued that I.C. § 19-2514 required the district court to impose a minimum
five-year fixed sentence, and actually indicated the opposite in its written
objection to Fencl's I.C.R. 35 motion. 3 (R., p.104.) Finally, as discussed below,
the record supports the sentence imposed. Because it is clear from the record
that any apparent district court misunderstanding of its sentencing discretion did
not actually impact the court's sentencing determination and denial of the I.C.R.
35 motion, any error is harmless.

However, it appears as though the district court wrote its denial order before it
had the opportunity to review the state's written objection. (See R., pp.103-109.)
The district court signed the denial order on April 5, 2014, and noted that "[t]he
state did not file a response [to the I.C.R. 35 motion]." (R., p.106, 109.) The
state filed its objection one day earlier, on April 4, 2014. (R., pp.103-105.)
3
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11.
Fencl Has Failed To Show That The District Court Imposed An Excessive
Sentence
A.

Introduction
Fencl asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an

excessive sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-14.) Fencl has failed to establish
that the district court's unified sentence of 15 years with five years fixed for felony
driving under the influence was excessive considering the objectives of
sentencing and Fencl's extensive criminal history and previous failed attempts at
rehabilitation.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.

C.

~

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is
excessive.

Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish that the

sentence is excessive, Fencl must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

9

~

In this case, the district court reviewed Fencl's presentence investigation
report and her GAIN-I substance abuse and mental health evaluation prior to
sentencing.

(Tr., p.17, Ls.11-15.)

It also recited the appropriate sentencing

factors. (Tr., p.31, L.2 - p.32, L.3.) A review of the record supports the district
court's sentencing determination.
Fencl has an extensive criminal history, including at least six prior
convictions for driving under the influence, the most recent two of which were
felony convictions. (PSI, pp.3-5, 93-98.) Several of these prior incidents appear
to have occurred while Fencl had a suspended license and/or was on probation
or parole. (See PSI, pp.3-5, 93-100, 112-121.) Certainly, community supervision
and license suspensions have been unsuccessful in preventing Fencl from
driving under the influence.

Fencl also has prior felony convictions for burglary

and grand theft, and prior misdemeanor convictions for petit theft, open container,
contempt, escape, driving without privileges, and resisting and obstructing an
officer. (PSI, pp.3-5, 93-98.)
Fencl has continued to commit crimes despite previous rehabilitative
opportunities. Fencl acknowledged to the presentence investigator that she had
participated in "several" substance abuse treatment programs, but that she "does
not always use" the tools she has learned. (PSI, pp.12, 16.) Fencl previously
had the opportunity to participate in the retained jurisdiction program, but violated
her probation upon release from custody by consuming alcohol and driving under
the influence. (PSI, pp.129-131.) The presentence investigator observed that

10

"previously imposed sanctions failed to satisfy the goals of deterrence and
rehabilitation." (PSI, p.16.)
On appeal, Fencl contends that the district court failed to give proper
weight or consideration to mitigating factors, including her expressed amenability
to further rehabilitation, remorse, ability to maintain employment and pursue an
education,

support from family and friends,

and

mental health issues.

(Appellant's brief, pp.11-14.) However, there is no indication in the record that
the district court ignored any of these factors. To the contrary, the court reviewed
the pre-sentence investigation report which contained the information Fencl
relied on to make her sentencing argument. (Tr., p.17, Ls.11-15.) The district
court expressly acknowledged Fencl's mental health issues and her sincerity in
expressing a desire for further rehabilitation.

(Tr., p.19, Ls.14-17; p.32, Ls.18-

22.) Further, at the sentencing hearing, the state acknowledged most of these
mitigating factors in its sentencing argument to the court and argued that its
recommended sentence "actually weighs all the mitigation in Ms. Fencl's case."
(Tr., p.24, Ls.3-8.)
The district court's concurrent unified sentence of 15 years with five years
fixed for Fencl's conviction for felony driving under the influence was entirely
reasonable in light of the nature of the crime, Fencl's significant criminal record,
and her previous failures on community supervision. Fencl has therefore failed
to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
sentence and denial of Fencl's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2014.

17}-e.___

4-

1--_,

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of November, 2014, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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